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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the dynamics of the link between inequality and inflation 
from a political economy perspective.  We consider a simple dynamic general 
equilibrium model in which agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, 
and inequality is persistent.  Inflation in our model is a mechanism of redistribution, 
and we find that the link between inequality and inflation within any period or over 
time depends on institutional and preference related parameters.  Furthermore, we 
find that differences in the initial distributions of wealth can yield a diverse set of 
patterns for the evolution of the inflation and inequality link.  Relative to existing 
literature, our model leads to more precise predictions about the inflation-inequality 
correlation.  To that end, results in the extant empirical literature on the inflation and 
inequality link need to be interpreted with caution.   
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1. Introduction 
The empirical experience of some countries prior to gaining central bank independence 
exhibits a great deal of diversity in economic outcomes. A common feature of this 
diversity, however, is that there is significant fluctuation observed in inflation, inequality 
and other economic aggregates. Early political economy models captured the idea that 
these fluctuations in inflation were politically induced. A seminal paper addressing this 
issue is that of Huffman (1997).  In a dynamic equilibrium model constructed to analyse 
the implications of different degrees of central bank independence, he shows that when 
agents are permitted to vote on the desired inflation rate and labour taxes to finance 
government spending, there is a great deal of fluctuation in inflation, output and 
investment. On the other hand, if the central bank is independent in the sense that agents 
are not allowed to vote on inflation and taxes, these fluctuations do not arise.  
      It is then of interest to explore why such fluctuations arise simply as a result of 
allowing political economy influences on the determination of central bank policies. That 
is, the behaviour of economic agents who cause these fluctuations must have an 
underlying economic rationale. Subsequent strands of literature have therefore focussed 
on inequality as the key mechanism behind these outcomes. The theoretical rationale 
provided in Dolmas et al. (2000), for example, is that inflation is a mechanism of 
redistribution, which implies that in the presence of inequality there is likely to be a 
greater degree of political pressure exerted on monetary authorities to use inflation as a 
re-distributive mechanism. 
      Similar in spirit to this paper is the extension considered in Bhattacharya et al. (2005), 
in which allowance is made for the fact that some agents in the economy can shield 
themselves from inflation by holding assets that are not subject to the inflation tax. They 
find that the relationship between inflation and inequality is non-monotonic, in contrast to 
the positive relationship suggested by Dolmas et al. (2000).  Both these papers however, 
do not explore the dynamic implications of their models. In that sense, they do not 
directly address the inflation- inequality link as a source of the fluctuations that are seen 
in the data.  Furthermore, while Huffman‟s (1997) model examines the dynamic patterns 
in inflation that are politically induced, these fluctuations are typically of a very stylized 
nature.   
      To that end, a combination of the different approaches described above is warranted. 
Ideally we would like a model to be dynamic as in Huffman‟s (1997) approach, while at 
the same time providing a scope to examine the inflation-inequality link considered in 
 2 
Bhattacharya et al (2005).  This paper therefore examines a model which is an extension 
of Bhattacharya et al (2005). Specifically, we incorporate dynamics by allowing agents to 
leave bequests to the next generation. Furthermore, the alternative mechanism of 
redistribution considered in our model is that of progressive taxation.   This is of 
particular importance given that Bhattacharya et al (2005) consider the somewhat 
regressive alternative of lump-sum taxes, which is likely to produce a bias towards a 
positive inflation-inequality correlation.
1
  (Albanesi, 2007). In other words, extant 
political economy models do not attempt to examine the inflation-inequality relationship 
in the presence of alternative means of redistribution. A priori, however, this is very 
important - inflation as a mechanism of redistribution would be relatively unimportant if 
other mechanisms of redistribution were sufficient.  
      Secondly, empirical evidence of the experience of some Latin American and other 
developing economies shows periods of cycles in inequality and annual average rates of 
inflation, where inequality is measured using the Gini coefficients of income 
distributions. Such cycles were experienced during periods before the implementation of 
macroeconomic reforms in relation to promoting the independence of central banks. See 
for example, Bittencourt (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2003), and Cukierman et al. (1992, 
2002). We also present some descriptive statistics on the inflation and inequality patterns 
of some Latin American countries in Figure 1. In the case of Brazil, for example, 
movements in inflation exhibit a similar pattern to movements in inequality. On the other 
hand, the inflation-inequality pattern in Mexico shows periods of upward movement in 
inflation coinciding with downward movement in inequality. Other countries appear to 
exhibit a mixture of both types of patterns. That is, there are some periods in which there 
is co-movement in these measures, while in others these measures show a negative link.  
      Given that these patterns occurred in periods roughly coinciding with times in which 
central banks of these countries were subject to political pressure, it is of interest to study 
models that explain such fluctuation as a result of the political process. As we have 
mentioned above, the models in Huffman (1996, 1997) partially address this issue in the 
sense that they produce politically induced cycles in the time path of economic 
aggregates.  We have also noted that these patterns are stylized, and the underlying 
theory is not designed specifically to address the type of diversity that is observed in the 
                                                 
1
 The overall relationship between inflation and inequality in their model is non-monotonic. However, for a 
very large range of inequality levels (as measured by the Gini coefficients of resource endowments) the 
relationship is, in fact, positive. 
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data. In particular, while Huffman‟s work focuses more on the individual time path of 
economic aggregates, it does not specifically consider the inflation and inequality nexus 
from a dynamic point of view.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Inflation and inequality in some Latin American countries 
(a) Colombia (b) Mexico 
(c) Brazil (d) Bolivia 
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      To address the above issues, we consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium 
model in which agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, and inequality 
is persistent.  This model is a variant of some of the static political economy models 
discussed above, viz Dolmas et al. (2000) and Bhattacharya et al. (2005), with 
intergenerational bequests introduced as a mechanism of persistence in inequality. A 
priori, depending on initial conditions, and the environment in question, there are several 
possibilities for the evolution of the inflation and inequality link, which we will briefly 
discuss below. These possibilities arise particularly in the case where the static link 
between inflation and inequality is non-monotonic and stem from an interesting feature of 
these models: viz., the evolution of inequality in these models is endogenous.  That is, a 
given level of inequality influences the desired inflation rate, which in turn determines 
the inequality of the wealth distribution in the subsequent period, which impacts on the 
next period inflation rate, and so on. 
      For instance, we could conjecture that depending on the initial conditions, the 
following scenario may emerge. In the presence of persistent inequality generated via 
intergenerational linkages, initial increases may lead to higher inflation, which could 
either reduce inequality through the redistributive process, or bring down the rate of 
increase in inequality.  In the latter case, further increases in inflation would eventually 
reduce inequality, leading to subsequent reductions in inflation due to politico-economic 
reasons.  One can also speculate on the possibility of cycles in which the pattern initially 
appears to exhibit an inverted-U shaped curve, and then reverses itself.  
      Our model tells us that such patterns are indeed possible depending on the initial 
conditions of the economy. In some cases there appear to be limit cycles; the pattern for 
inequality resembles a series of inverted-U shaped curves.  That is, inequality increases 
and then decreases over time, and this pattern appears to repeat itself.
2
  Interestingly, in 
some cases, the corresponding pattern for inflation may also be very similar.  In other 
cases, inequality initially appears to follow a inverted-U shaped pattern, and then 
increases again; the corresponding pattern for inflation is similar. The model also 
provides a political economy rationale for why the patterns in inequality can reverse over 
time.  An implication of this feature of the model is that, depending on the data set in 
question, one can find either a U-shaped or inverted-U shaped relationship for the 
                                                 
2
  There is a superficial similarity here with the „Kuznets Curve‟ type of pattern in inequality. However, 
given the structure of our model it would be fallacious to label these patterns as recurring Kuznets Curves.  
In our model these patterns emerge due to periodic changes in wealth as a result of redistribution while the 
Kuznets hypothesis correlates this pattern to various stages of development and the growth in income. 
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dynamics of inequality, thus providing a political economy rationale for the specific 
patterns that have been identified in the data. To some degree, our model is then capable 
of producing patterns that are at least qualitatively similar to what we observe in Figure 
1.  
      We view the results of our model and its analysis as an important exploratory step in 
the direction of future research in this area. Ideally, to be able to produce empirically 
testable hypotheses, one needs to design a fully realized economic environment, 
amenable to calibration, and endowed with various institutional and structural features of 
transitional economies. For example, we would like to consider a production economy 
where taxes have distortionary effects, and the costs associated with inflation-shielded 
assets are specified more realistically.  However, before one undertakes such a step, it is 
natural to explore a simple environment similar to that of our model. Introducing too 
many complex features in one step obscures the individual impact of these features.  
Therefore, in common with conventional approaches to the process of modelling, we 
have chosen to start with an economic environment that is simple and intuitive, albeit 
relatively stylized.   
      Secondly, the development of a fully realized environment requires progress not only 
along theoretical dimensions, but also on the empirical front. For example, a detailed 
analysis of the empirical patterns should inform directions for theoretical research and 
vice versa. However, due to limited data availability, it is difficult to study the patterns 
mentioned above. Specifically, while there is a long span of data for inflation, at various 
frequencies, this is not true of measures of inequality. For this reason, one has to leave 
the above mentioned suggestions for future empirical and theoretical investigations.  
      We believe that the suggested agenda of research is likely to be very fruitful. Even 
the somewhat stylized model of this paper leads to relatively more precise predictions in 
relation to various parameters and the inflation-inequality correlation. That is, the 
corresponding predictions in the extant literature are not as clear-cut. As we see in our 
numerical simulations, an economy with an initial Gini coefficient falling within the 
range in which the static link between inflation and inequality is positive, can produce a 
dynamic pattern over time that is characterized by a negative inflation-inequality 
correlation. The pattern actually depends critically on the initial conditions as 
characterized by other parameters of the model such as the tax rate and the fixed cost of 
the inflation-shielded asset. Our extension of some of the static models in the extant 
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literature brings out this point, and therefore leads to a better understanding of the 
political economy link between inflation and inequality.  
      Subsequent sections of this paper are organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a 
simple extension of some static political economy models in the literature, modified to 
include mechanisms that allow for persistence in inequality, which in turn also enables a 
meaningful dynamic analysis of such models.  We also include income and wealth 
taxation, but abstract from political economy determination of these mechanisms in order 
to simplify our analysis.  In Section 3 we present an analysis of the results based on 
numerical simulations of our model. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Economic Environment 
We consider an overlapping-generations economy in which agents live for two periods, 
with a new generation born in every period.  Agents in this model are indexed by i to 
denote the fact that there is heterogeneity in their wealth endowment. Time is discrete 
and indexed by t = 1, 2, 3,….  The ith agent born in period t has an endowment ity  of the 
consumption good when young.  The agent also receives a bequest itw  from the previous 
generation, which supplements the agent‟s first period resource endowment. The agent‟s 
composite wealth endowment is then given by ititit wyz  .  The initial period‟s 
distribution of this endowment is described by (.)F .    
      An agent‟s preferences are described by the following lifetime utility function: 
                      )1()()ln()ln(),,( 1111   itititititit bccbccU   
Here itc  and 1itc refer to the consumption in periods t and t+1 of an agent born in period 
t.  The agent also leaves a bequest 1itb for the next generation.  The parameter   is the 
subjective discount factor, while   is a parameter representing the extent of 
intergenerational altruism in the model.  As in Bhattacharya et al. (2005), agents in this 
model have a choice between two instruments of saving. One instrument is money ( itm ) 
and the other is a “storage” technology ( its ) which is associated with a fixed cost δ.  In 
equilibrium, for a sufficiently large δ, it is then possible that some agents will hold 
money, while the remainder will hold the storage technology. Note that it is possible to 
ensure that all agents in the economy hold money provided δ is large enough. In that 
case, this model is essentially equivalent to a dynamic version of Dolmas et al. (2000). 
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     The agents holding money face the following budget constraints in the two periods of 
their lives:   
  )2()1( titit
m
it TRmzc    
                           )3(.11 t
m
ititt
m
it TRMbmRc                                                                               
Here, the superscript “m” is used to denote the choice variables of agents holding money.  
Furthermore, in equations (2) and (3), itm represents saving in the form of fiat money 
undertaken when the agent is young.  Agents are also subject to a tax on their composite 
wealth endowment when young, which is denoted by .  The tax revenue raised in this 
manner is redistributed to the agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer, given in the first 
period of their lives.  The variable tTR denotes this transfer and is given by 
t
z
z
ititt zdzFzTR
it
it
 








 
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)( .   
      The return on money is represented by tR , and is equal to   
t1
1
, where t is the 
rate of inflation. Now the variable tTRM  denotes seigniorage based transfers, and we 
briefly outline its determination here. To that end, let tM  represent the stock of money 
balances outstanding at the end of period t.  If we assume that the money stock grows at a 
rate t  in each period, 1)1(  tt MM  . The monetary authority in this economy makes 
transfer payments to the old agents, which are financed by money creation. Thus the 
budget constraint of the monetary authority in nominal terms is 1 ttt MMT  where tT  
represents the transfer payments made during period t in nominal terms, and  
t
t
t
t
t
tt M
M
MT


 



11
. 
Dividing by the price level in period t to express the above equation in real terms, we get 
)4(.)1( ttt mRTRM    
Here, tm is the average quantity of money held by agents. This average quantity is 
determined by aggregating the optimal savings of agents in the economy holding money.  
      On the other hand, the budget constraints applying to agents holding the storage 
technology are given by: 
      )5()1(   titit
s
it TRszc  
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s
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s
it TRMbsxc    
Here, tx  refers to the return on storage technology where tt Rxx  . We restrict tR  to 
belong to the closed interval [0, 1]. The other notations in the above equations are 
identical to equations (2) and (3), appropriately superscripted with “s” to denote the 
choice variables of agents holding the storage technology.   
    There is a critical level of the composite wealth endowment beyond which agents 
switch to the storage technology. Let this level be denoted by tzˆ . Then for agents holding 
resources below tzˆ  the optimal consumption, savings and bequest plans are described 
respectively by the following: 
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Similarly, the optimal plans of the agents with an endowment greater than or equal to 
tzˆ are given by:  
)11()1(
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We now describe in further detail the derivation of the seigniorage based transfer tTRM , 
and the political process which determines the inflation rate in this economy. In common 
with Dolmas et al. (2000) we assume that in each period t, the young agents vote on the 
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desired inflation rate prior to their consumption and savings decision.
3
 The „timeline‟ for 
the model is described in Figure 2 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline 
 
Using equation (9), we can write the average quantity of money held by agents as   
follows.  
(1 ) 1
(1 ) . (15)
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
t
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t
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Here 
t
it
Z
Z
ititt zdFzz
ˆ
min
)(  represents the average wealth levels of the sub-cohort of agents 
holding money. Now we can substitute this into equation (4) and solve for seigniorage 
based transfers ( tTRM ) as follows:  
 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (16)
1 (1 ) (1 )
t t
t tt
t t
R R
TRM z z
R R
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      The decision to hold storage or money is based on a comparison of indirect utilities 
from holding storage and money.  The agents with wealth endowment itz , for whom 
)()( it
m
it
s zVzV  will not hold any money.  Here sV and mV respectively represent the 
indirect utility functions for agents holding the storage technology and agents holding 
                                                 
3
  For the justification of the assumption regarding timing, and that only the young vote, see Dolmas et al. 
(2000), and Bhattacharya et al. (2005). 
Young vote on tR  
Young born, get 
resource endowment 
and bequests from 
previous generation. 
Voting outcome 
revealed. 
Consumption, savings 
and bequests decision 
based on election 
results. 
Agents decide whether 
to hold money or 
storage. 
t t+1 
Time 
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money.  Other parameters entering the utility functions are suppressed for notational 
convenience. We can then derive the following result. 
Proposition 1: Let 
)1(1
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hold the storage technology iff 
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 . 
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix A. Note that the critical level of 
wealth above which agents choose to hold the storage technology depends on various 
parameters of the model in interesting ways.  This critical level is increasing in the fixed 
cost parameter   and the parameter t , and the underlying intuition is fairly obvious.  It 
is also clear that the tax parameter   will be of some significance to the equilibrium 
outcomes of this model. 
      The computation of equilibrium in this model involves the following steps.  Given tR  
and the critical level of resources tzˆ  for which agents choose the storage technology, one 
can determine tTRM .  However  tTRM  as defined by Proposition 1 above determines tzˆ .  
Our numerical procedure therefore essentially involves looking for a fixed point:  For 
each value of tR in a grid of 1000 points in (0,1], we make an initial guess for the 
corresponding tzˆ , and then compute tTRM .  We then update our guess for tzˆ .  The 
procedure is repeated until convergence is achieved.  To compute the optimal inflation 
rate, we again compare utilities for each agent for different tR .  We then add up the 
“votes” for each tR , and the winner is decided using the plurality rule.
4
   
     We now turn to a brief discussion of the dynamics of this model.  Somewhat 
heuristically, the presence of a fixed cost introduces a “non-convexity” in this model, 
which ensures that inequality will be more persistent.  (See Piketty 2000, for a discussion 
of relevant literature).  Again, to simplify the dynamics, we assume that the distribution 
of income is fixed across generations, so that the dynamics of the model essentially 
depends on the evolution of bequests.  However, the bequest function for an agent in this 
                                                 
4
  Note that preferences in this model are not necessarily “single-peaked”, so the median voter theorem 
need not apply.  Also, results do not differ if we use the majority rule.  In all of our simulation the winning 
alternative got more than 50% of the vote. 
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model may be truncated; for resources less than tzˆ  she would hold money, while for 
resources greater than  tzˆ  she would hold storage.   
The optimal bequest functions for the two cases are given by: 
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   This truncation allows for the possibility of divergence in the bequest levels in the 
presence of inequality.  Also, our numerical simulations of this model, presented in the 
next section illustrate the possibility of cycles in inflation and inequality. 
 
3. Results Based on Numerical Experiments 
In what follows, we discuss the results based on some quantitative experiments using the 
model of this paper.  Here, we first analyse the static relationship between inflation and 
inequality in any given period, and then examine the dynamic implications of the model. 
The static initial period relationship between inequality, as characterized by the Gini 
coefficient of the resource distribution, and the desired value of Rt, is presented in Figure 
3(a) below.  In this figure the value of δ is set at 71 while we consider two cases for τ, 
namely τ = 0.2 and τ = 0.4.  
      While the outcome bears a superficial similarity to the Bhattacharya et al. (2005) 
results, the underlying rationale for Figure 3(a) is quite different in our model. Also note 
that the inflation-inequality relationship is critically conditional on the tax parameter τ.  
Basically, as τ decreases we get closer to the Bhattacharya et al. outcome. The presence 
of the tax parameter also causes a „jump‟ for certain levels of inequality; beyond a certain 
level of inequality the extent of redistribution through taxation is high enough to enable 
all agents in the economy to hold storage. The desired rate of inflation then jumps to a 
very high level.  
      To understand more clearly the mechanisms underlying the outcomes in our model, 
we present a deeper analysis of the link between inflation and inequality for the case in 
which δ=90, with other parameters set at the levels in Figure 3(a).  The results of this 
experiment are presented in Figure 3(b), in which the first panel presents “elected” 
inflation rates corresponding to initial inequality levels, as characterized by Gini 
coefficients for composite resource distributions.   
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Figure 3(a): Optimal Rt as inequality increases, 0.2   and 0.4  ,   =1, δ=71. 
 
 
Figure 3(b): Analysis for the static version of the model with 0.2  , 90 . 
 
     First, we consider the cases in which initial inequality remains fairly low.  In this case, 
we see that the level of inflation remains at 0.1502%.
5
  This is because, the percentage of 
money holders in this economy, as reported in the third panel of 3(b) is quite high, and a 
large percentage of these money holders are in favour of the elected rate, as indicated in 
the fourth panel of Figure 3(b).  For low levels of inequality, the percentage of money 
                                                 
5
    The vote on the desired return on money is on the open interval (0,1), so we essentially have a corner 
solution in this case. 
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holders in favor, in fact, constitute the majority.  See for example the second and third 
panels of Figure 3(b). This is because most of the agents holding money would like a 
high return to holding money, and while they do care about the seigniorage transfer, 
some redistribution is already taking place via the mechanism of taxation.  Storage-
holders, on the other hand choose the inflation rate that maximizes the seigniorage 
transfer function – i.e. the peak of the Laffer curve for seigniorage revenue. A small 
percentage of the richer money-holders also prefer the inflation rate corresponding to this 
peak, which would perhaps enable them to switch to storage, and gain a higher level of 
utility.  
      As inequality increases, the percentage of money-holders declines, but most of them 
still prefer a low inflation rate.  Storage-holders still prefer the inflation rate which 
maximizes the seigniorage transfer, but this rate does not constitute the political 
equilibrium.   However, after a critical level of inequality is reached, the composition of 
the population shifts towards those who are in favor of a high inflation rate.  This is 
because, in this model high inequality entails a significant increase in the income-tax 
based transfer, enabling more people to hold storage.  In this case, we can again 
distinguish three groups of people.  All money-holders prefer the minimum possible 
inflation rate.  The second group consists of the poorer storage-holders who would also 
prefer a lower inflation rate. (That is, if their preferred inflation rate was voted for, they 
would switch to holding money consequently attaining a higher utility level than in the 
present situation).  The third group, which constitutes the majority, consists of all storage 
holders who prefer the inflation tax rate that maximizes the seigniorage transfer. 
      As inequality increases further, the pattern that emerges is hard to interpret on an 
intuitive level, and this is perhaps another artefact of the non-convexity of the model.  As 
the number of money-holders decreases, the inflation tax base shrinks and numerical 
simulations (not reported here) show that the peak of the Laffer curve shifts to the right in 
the ),( tt TRMR  plane, so the inflation rate in the political equilibrium declines.  
Eventually, beyond a very high level of inequality, there is a jump in the inflation rate – 
most people in the economy are holding storage due to the high level of redistribution via 
the linear income and wealth tax.  The inflation tax base is almost close to zero and the 
rate that maximizes the seigniorage transfer is very high.  
      In general we can discern the following pattern underlying the determination of the 
optimal Rt.  When there is a small proportion of money holders in the economy, inflation 
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rates are usually high, and there is a non-monotonic link between inflation and inequality.  
On the other hand, when money-holders form a majority, inflation rates are typically low.  
Returning to figure 3(a), the cases involve a relatively low value of the cost parameter 
(δ=71), so that for low to moderate levels of inequality the percentage of money-holders 
is quite small.  At high levels of inequality, redistribution via the linear income tax 
ensures that most of the people in the economy have switched to the storage technology, 
and the optimal inflation rate has jumped to the “corner solution” value.  It is also clear 
from the figure that a higher value of the linear tax parameter   ensures a lower rate of 
inflation in the non-monotonic range, but the jump to the higher inflation rate occurs at a 
lower level of inequality.  
    The patterns described above also manifest themselves in the dynamics of the model, 
which we now turn to. Factors that will matter for the dynamics of the model are as 
follows: 
(a) The range of inequality in which the economy is situated at any given point of 
time. 
(b) Whether storage-holders or money-holders constitute the majority.  Generally a 
majority of money holders implies a low inflation rate, while the opposite is true 
for the case in which storage holders constitute the majority. 
(c) The size of the inflation-tax base. When this is relatively small, there is a 
possibility of low or moderate inflation rates in spite of storage-holders being in 
the majority. This is exemplified in the static cases analysed in figures 3(a) and 
3(b); the peak of the Laffer curve shifts to the right in the ),( tt TRMR space in 
such cases.  However, in the extreme case in which the inflation tax base is very 
close to zero, the optimal inflation is the highest possible rate that can be voted 
for. 
(d) The extent of progressive taxation.  Higher income taxes are associated with low 
inflation and a lower volatility of inflation, with the exception of the case in 
which the entire economy consists of storage holders. 
(e) The fixed cost of holding the storage technology.  Higher values of   are 
associated with lower inflation rates in our model. 
      It turns out that depending on initial conditions, there are myriad possibilities for the 
evolution of inflation and inequality in this framework. In what follows, we basically 
consider experiments involving variations of several parameters of the model. Given the 
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stylized nature of the model it is not feasible to undertake a full-blown calibration 
exercise. We therefore considered a sensitivity analysis involving ranges of values of 
various parameters. Naturally it was not feasible to present all of these experiments. The 
parameter experiments below essentially cover the variety of patterns that emerged from 
our sensitivity analysis.  
      Figure 4(a) presents the case in which the initial resource distribution is described by 
a Gini coefficient equal to 0.35.
6
  We also assume in this case the following values of 
parameters: 1; 1; 80     .  The four panels in this figure represent the evolution 
over time of the Gini coefficient, the percentage of people holding money, the elected 
inflation rate, and the percentage of agents voting in favour of the elected rate.  The solid 
line represents the case in which the tax parameter  is set equal to 0.3, and the dashed 
line represents the case in which 0.5  . 
     We first look at the 0.3  case in Figure 4(a).  Here fluctuations in inflation move 
with fluctuations in inequality as characterized by the Gini coefficient of resource 
endowments in the economy.  Increasing inequality appears to increase inflation, leading 
to decreases in the next period‟s inequality via redistribution.  The decrease in inequality 
then leads to a lower inflation rate, which in turn seems to increase inequality in the next 
period.  The correlation between inflation and inequality is positive and approximately 
=0.68.  However, the fluctuations in inflation are more dramatic.  The large jumps in the 
inflation rate appear to coincide with the percentage of agents holding money, but the 
pattern is not unambiguous – there is a time horizon over which inflation fluctuates, but 
the seigniorage tax base declines steadily. 
      Looking at the 0.5   case we find an entirely different pattern in the model‟s 
inequality-inflation path.  The correlation between the model‟s time series on inflation 
and inequality is now negative and approximately equal to -0.33.  However, both the 
levels of inequality and inflation are much lower, as the alternative form of redistribution 
is considerably more progressive.  In contrast to the 0.3  case the increases in the 
seigniorage base is now associated with declines in the inflation rate. 
     
 
                                                 
6
 In all our simulations we use an initial distribution which is lognormal with mean 1.2.  All the initial 
distributions considered in our experiments are mean preserving spreads of this distribution. 
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Figure 4(a): Dynamics of Model 2, initial Gini =.35, 1  ; 80  . 
 
Figure 4(b):Laffer Curves; initial Gini =.35, 1  ; 80  . 
Rt Rt 
Rt 
Rt 
Rt 
Rt 
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       In Figure 4(b) above we attempt to explore the dynamics of the Laffer curves – i.e 
the lump-sum seigniorage based transfer TRMt as a function of Rt, corresponding to 
various time periods.  The peaks corresponding to the 0.3  case move to the left over 
time, indicating high levels of the optimal inflation rate.  This also happens in the 0.5   
case but the shift is smaller. 
      Next we consider some experiments that change the fixed cost parameter  , keeping 
other parameters as in the case of Figure 4, with 0.3  .  Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate 
the results of this experiment.  A sufficiently high fixed cost of holding the storage 
technology is associated with a steady level of inflation that is close to zero, and a lower 
level of inequality.  Intuitively, this is reasonably clear – there are a large number of 
people holding money and redistribution is better achieved via a small amount of 
inflation to supplement income and wealth taxation, given that inflation reduces the 
return on saving.  Low values of the fixed cost imply that a minority of agents hold 
money, and storage holders simply vote for the inflation rate that maximizes the 
seigniorage based transfer.  Figure 5(c) presents the corresponding dynamic patterns in 
the evolution of the Laffer curves, and are consistent with the results presented in 5(a) 
and (b). 
 
Figure 5(a): Same initial distribution as above, 0.3  , experiments with  . 
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Figure 5(b): Same initial distribution, experiments with  . 
 
Figure 5(c): Laffer Curves; same initial distribution as above, 0.3  , experiments with 
 . 
Rt Rt 
Rt Rt 
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      The experiments in Figures 4 and 5 assumed an initial distribution characterized by a 
Gini coefficient of 0.35.  We now turn to experiments that use a different initial 
distribution, characterized by a Gini coefficient equal to 0.4387.  The time horizon 
considered is also longer since the patterns in this case can change dramatically, after 
initially seeming to converge to a steady state.  Figures 6(a)-6(d) consider the case for 
which the other parameters are fixed at 1; 1; 80; 0.3       .  The pattern in Figure 
6(a) shows an inverted-U shaped pattern in inequality for the first 20 periods, which is 
also mirrored in the pattern for inflation in the first 20 periods – the inflation inequality 
correlation in this period is 0.7927.  Subsequently, the pattern changes dramatically – 
inequality decreases and inflation increases for about 30 periods.  After about 70 periods 
the model appears to enter an equilibrium with cycles in inflation and inequality, with a 
series of recurring patterns in inequality that resemble a series of inverted-U shaped 
curves.  The overall correlation between inflation and inequality over the entire time 
horizon considered is negative and equal to -0.6061. As illustrated in Figure 6(c) and 
Figure 6(d) this is an economy with a relatively small number of people holding money, 
which as illustrated by our previous experiments correlates with high levels of inflation.  
The fluctuations in the percentage of agents holding money coincides with the jumps in 
the inflation rate observed in Figure 6(b).  
 
Figure 6(a): Initial Gini=.4387, 1, 80, 0.3     . 
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Figure 6(b): Initial Gini=.4387, 1, 80, 0.3     . 
 
 
 
Figure 6(c): Percentage of money/storage holders.  
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Figure 6(d): Percentage in favour of the elected inflation rate. 
       Figures 7(a)-(d) report the corresponding experiments with the fixed cost parameter.  
For a sufficiently high  , the percentage of people holding money become part of the 
majority, thus inducing an immediate convergence to a steady state with low inflation.  
However, inequality converges rapidly to a steady state which is higher than the one 
associated with a lower fixed cost. 
 
Figure 7(a): Experiments with  , other parameters the same as the previous experiment. 
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Figure 7(b): Experiments with  , other parameters the same as the previous experiment. 
 
 
 
Figure 7(c): Experiments with  , other parameters the same as the previous experiment. 
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Figure 7(d): Experiments with  , other parameters the same as the previous experiment. 
 
Figures 8(a)-(c) report the corresponding experiments with the exogenous tax rate.  
Again, in contrast to the set of experiments with an initial distribution corresponding to a 
lower Gini coefficient, a higher tax rate corresponds to a steady state with a higher level 
of inflation.  This is in spite of the fact that a higher tax rate reduces inequality to a 
significantly lower level in comparison with the case in which there is a lower tax rate. 
 
Figure 8(a): Experiments with  , 80  , other parameters as in figure 7. 
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Figure 8(b): Experiments with  , 80  , other parameters as in figure 7. 
 
Figure 8(c): Experiments with  , 80  , other parameters as in figure 7. 
 
 
     The above experiments serve to illustrate the fact that the dynamic implications of a 
fairly stylized political economy model of inflation and inequality can be very complex.  
Multiple equilibria are possible, which are very diverse in nature.  In particular, changes 
in exogenous institutional parameters or initial conditions can produce very persistent 
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cycles in inflation and inequality, or lead to high inflation traps.  In a sense, these results 
reinforce the literature in support of central bank independence.  This is especially true of 
economies in which initial conditions are conducive to high volatility and inflation traps.  
The case for central bank independence becomes even stronger when the monetary 
authority does not have complete information about the underlying structural parameters 
of the economy. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we examine the dynamics of the link between inequality and inflation from 
a political economy perspective.  This exploration is motivated, in part, by the diversity 
of the empirical experience of some countries prior to gaining central bank 
independence.  A common feature, amidst this diversity, however, is that there is a great 
deal of fluctuation observed in inflation and inequality.  Early political economy models 
captured the idea that these fluctuations were politically induced.  However, such models 
did not capture the diversity of these patterns.  We believe that our model is an important 
exploratory step in this direction. 
      Specifically, we consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which 
agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, and inequality is persistent.  
Inflation in our model is a mechanism of redistribution, and we find that the link between 
inequality and inflation in any period depends on institutional features such as the extent 
of progressive taxation in the economy, or the cost of adopting technologies that shield 
agents from inflation.  We find that differences in the initial distributions of wealth and 
income can yield a diverse set of patterns for the evolution of the inflation and inequality 
link.  In some cases the pattern for inequality resembles a series of inverted-U shaped 
curves – i.e, inequality increases and then decreases over time, and this pattern appears to 
repeat itself.  Interestingly, in some cases the corresponding pattern for inflation may also 
be very similar.  In other cases, inequality initially appears to follow an inverted-U 
shaped pattern, and then increases again; the corresponding pattern for inflation is 
similar.  
     The above experiments serve to underline the fact that the dynamic implications of a 
fairly simple political economy model of inflation and inequality can be very complex.  
Multiple equilibria are possible, and there is a great deal of diversity in the nature of these 
equilibria.   
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      Furthermore, extant political economy models do no not attempt to examine the 
inflation-inequality relationship in the presence of alternative means of redistribution.  A 
priori, however, this is very important – inflation as a mechanism of redistribution would 
be relatively unimportant if other mechanisms of redistribution were sufficient.  In our 
model this idea is captured by including a progressive tax parameter. 
      In addition, our model leads to several clear-cut empirical predictions in relation to 
various parameters and the inflation-inequality correlation.  In existing literature, 
however, the empirical predictions are somewhat imprecise, given the static nature of 
these models.  As we have seen in our numerical simulations, an economy with an initial 
Gini coefficient falling within the range in which the static link between inflation and 
inequality is positive, can produce a dynamic pattern over tome that is characterized by a 
negative inflation-inequality correlation.  The pattern depends critically on the initial 
conditions as characterized by other parameters in the model, such as the tax rate, and the 
cost of the inflation-shielded asset.  Our extension of some of the static models in the 
extant literature brings out this point, and therefore leads to a better understanding of the 
political economy link between inflation and inequality.  
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Appendix A 
 
Proof of Proposition1 
Households hold storage iff indirect utility of holding storage is greater than indirect 
utility of holding money.  That is, 
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(
),,(),,(
1111
1111
m
it
m
it
m
it
s
it
s
it
s
it
m
it
m
it
m
it
ms
it
s
it
s
it
s
bccbcc
bccUbccU





 
Recall that we can re-write the optimal consumption, and bequest plans given in the 
paper (by equations 7and 9) for the agents holding money as follows.  
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Furthermore, following the same approach we can write analogous optimal consumption, 
and bequest plans for the agents holding storage.  
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Now we can substitute these four expressions into equation (2) above. After simplifying, 
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We can further simply the above inequality condition as follows. 
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The analogous optimal consumption plans for agents holding storage is given by; 
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Substituting for sitc , 
m
itc  into equation (3) above, it is possible to define threshold level of 
wealth required for a households to switch to storage technology )ˆ( tz  as follows. 
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